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Whilst many countries have been devolving power to the sub-national level England has 
moved in the opposite direction.  For the last decade English local government has been 
subjected to tight top down performance monitoring and financial controls.  The 
evidence suggests that these policies have helped to encourage significant improvements 
in performance.  However critics argue that they have been costly to implement and have 
undermined local democratic accountability. In response to these concerns the current 
government has promised to sweep away external assessment in favour of self-regulation 
by councils and in-depth scrutiny by citizens. This ‘new localism’ poses important 
questions for both policy makers and researchers. In particular how far will the 
promised reforms actually go and what impacts will they have on the service standards? 
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Introduction  
Successive governments in the UK have exerted tight control over local authority 
services and spending. Leading local government figures and commentators railed 
against what they see as the erosion of local autonomy but proved powerless to stem the 
rising tide of centralisation. Opposition parties frequently pledged to hand powers back 
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to local government only to renege on their promises once in office. All this changed 
however in the summer of 2010 when ministers in a newly elected coalition government 
moved swiftly to begin the process of dismantling the top down performance frameworks 
they had inherited from their predecessors (Grace 2010).  
 
This paper examines the impacts of the performance monitoring of English local 
authorities by central government between 1997 and 2010 and assesses the prospects for 
the very different policies that are now being pursued. It draws on an analysis of 
performance data undertaken as part of a major programme of longitudinal evaluation of 
the previous government’s policies plus an examination the key policy statements and 
legislation issued by the current government. The first section charts the loss of local 
autonomy under both Conservative and Labour administrations over the last thirty years. 
The second section examines the impacts that these policies had on local services. The 
paper then turns to the current government’s proposals. It argues that they could mark a 
decisive break with the experiences of the last thirty years but there are a number of 
problems and potential pitfalls which pose important questions for future research.  
 
The Rise of Centralism 
The hollowing out of the local state under the Thatcher and Major governments which 
held power in the UK between 1979 and 1997 has been well documented. Their policies 
were inspired by the ‘New Right’ which saw public sector bureaucracies as inefficient 
and unresponsive compared to the private sector. Compulsory competitive tendering 
(CCT) led to the externalisation of swathes of local government services to the private 
sector (Rao and Young 1995; Walsh et al. 1997; Boyne 1998; Choi 1999; Vincent-Jones 
1999). Other traditional local government functions were transferred to local appointed 
bodies controlled by unelected boards comprising local politicians, business people and 
community representatives. Council house tenants were given the right to buy their 
homes at reduced rates and remaining stocks were transferred to arm’s length companies. 
Schools were encouraged to opt out of local authority control.  
 
Local government spending was tightly controlled and its performance increasingly 
monitored by the centre. Ministers dictated how much funding local authorities received 
by capping ‘excessive’ council tax increases and ring fencing grants for use by specific 
services (Fender and Watt 2002). Meanwhile the Audit Commission was created in 1983 
to check that local councils were achieving economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
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(McSweeney 1988).  A decade later it was given responsibility for designing and 
auditing statutory performance indicators which councils had to use so that their 
performance could be compared over time and between areas (Humphrey 2002).  
 
There was fierce local opposition from public sector trades unions to what they regarded 
as an assault on their members’ pay and conditions, and many Labour controlled 
authorities sought to find ways around CCT legislation. But the lack of local fiscal 
autonomy (around 80 percent of local authority expenditure in the UK is met from 
central government grants) and the absence of any constitutional guarantees of local 
government’s roles or even its continued existence meant that ministers were able to 
abolish the largest authorities which were the most vocal critics of government policies. 
 
In some respects the ‘New Labour’ Government led by Prime Minister Blair picked up 
where the New Right had left off. But there were important differences. The 
Conservatives’ strategy had been to divest the state of responsibility for service delivery 
through privatisation. By contrast Labour promised to invest in local government so long 
as it signed up to a programme of modernisation. Blair and his advisers were reluctant ‘to 
trust their party colleagues in local government with money or functions, or even with 
the unchaperoned exercise of common party purposes’ (Walker 1998, p.4). They feared 
that the actions of what the popular press had labelled ‘Loony Left’ councils would prove 
a political liability, threatening Labour’s prospects of winning a second term in office. 
The 1998 Local Government White Paper therefore made it clear that in the 
Government’s view ‘The old culture of paternalism and inwardness’ had to ‘be swept 
away’ and local authorities were expected to embrace ‘a demanding agenda for change’ 
(Cmnd 4014). Ministers pledged to abolish CCT and ‘crude and universal capping’ of 
local authority budgets (Cmnd 4014, para 5.7). However in a speech to a conference of 
Labour local council leaders, the Prime Minister warned ‘If you are unwilling or unable 
to work to the modern agenda then the government will have to look to other partners to 
take on your role’ (Blair 1998). According to his advisers local government was 
‘drinking in the last chance saloon’.  
 
In 1999 responsibility for overseeing most aspects of local government policy in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland was devolved to newly created administrations. 
Ministers in these countries adopted a more consensual approach to their dealings with 
local authorities. There were few hypothecated grants and little enthusiasm for 
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contracting out services or top down performance monitoring (Downe et al. 2010). By 
contrast English councils became subject to an unprecedented level of external inspection 
and financial control from the centre (Lowndes 2002). Over the following decade they 
received large year-on-year increases in the level of central government grants to local 
authorities. But ministers retained powers to limit council tax rises in order to guard 
against what they regarded as excessive increases and they tightened controls on how 
councils spent the funding which they were given by increasing the number of ‘ring 
fenced’ grants, particularly in education which accounts for almost 40% of local 
authority spending (Travers 2004).  By 2010 more than two thirds of central government 
funding to English local authorities was ear marked by ministers for specific purposes; 
just 31% was given to them as a block grant (HM Treasury 2010).  
 
Labour ministers were also keen to see the private sector play an increased role in the 
provision of local public services. In their view the problem with CCT was that the way 
in which it had been implemented had ‘led to unimaginative tendering, and often 
frustrated rather than enhanced real competition’ (Cmnd 4014, para 7.22). On average 
contracts advertised between 1989 and 1992 attracted fewer than one external bid (Walsh 
and Davis 1993), and even after more than a decade of CCT internal providers were still 
winning well over half of all tenders and almost three quarters of the estimated £2.4 
billion worth of business covered by the legislation (LGMB 1997). The top-down 
imposition of market testing had, the Labour Government argued, poisoned relationships 
between public and private sectors, and the emphasis on economy had led to a decline in 
service quality as in-house and external bidders alike were forced to pare tenders to the 
bone in order to secure contracts (Walsh et al. 1997; Coulson 1998).  
 
For all these reasons CCT was replaced with a new duty of ‘Best Value’ which, far from 
doing away with externalisation, was designed to ‘create the conditions under which 
there is likely to be greater interest from the private and voluntary sectors in working 
with local government to deliver quality services at a competitive price’ (Cmnd 4014, 
clause 7.30). Section 4 of the 1999 Local Government Act required authorities to put in 
place arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the discharge of all of their 
functions. To comply with this new duty they had to submit services to a series of ‘tests 
of competitiveness’. If ‘other more efficient and effective means’ were found to be 
available services had to be outsourced (DETR, 1998 p. 20). To ensure that authorities 
complied with this new duty ministers introduced a performance management framework 
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which required every council to conduct fundamental reviews of all of its functions over 
a five year period (Ball et al. 2002) and publish annual plans setting out details of current 
performance and targets for future improvements.  
 
For the first time all local services were now subject to external inspection and the 
Secretary of State was given powers to intervene directly where authorities failed to 
conduct sufficiently robust reviews or there was thought to be a risk of serious or 
persistent underperformance (DETR 1999). To monitor improvements the Government 
devised more than 200 Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs) covering frontline 
and corporate services which came with 287 pages of guidance designed to ensure that 
data collected by councils were comparable (Boyne 2002). 
 
Within a year this highly bureaucratic regime had run into serious difficulties. Most 
authorities undertook a far larger number of much more narrowly focused reviews than 
the Government and the Audit Commission had anticipated. As a result it was impossible 
for inspectors to scrutinise them all. More importantly, senior officials had come to the 
view that inspecting services in isolation was unlikely to get to grips with the root causes 
of underperformance. The experience of early interventions in so called failing councils 
pointed to underlying problems in their corporate systems. The Audit Commission 
concluded that ‘serious and sustained service failure is also a failure of corporate 
leadership’ (Audit Commission, 2002: 19). Inspecting services in isolation was therefore 
of limited value because ‘Without clear corporate leadership for change it becomes a 
very negative task based process’ (Audit Commission, 2001: 14).  
 
As a result from 2002 onwards the Government introduced a new framework known as 
Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPAs). These judged the overall 
performance of each council and categorised them on a five point scale - ‘poor’, ‘weak’, 
‘fair’, ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. Services were divided into seven main ‘blocks’ 
(environment, housing, culture, fire and rescue, services to children, social care and 
benefits administration) in the case of upper tier and unitary authorities, and four 
(housing, environment, culture and benefits administration) in the case of district 
councils. Scores for each of these groupings were weighted according to their importance 
to national government and then aggregated to give an overall ‘performance’ score. This 
was then combined with an assessment of the council’s ‘corporate capacity’ to provide 
an overall rating. The results for the 150 single tier and county councils in England were 
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published annually. Those for district councils and fire and rescue authorities were 
published less often. Authorities that were placed in the bottom two categories were 
subject to external intervention and support which often resulted in the removal of senior 
managers and in some cases political leaders.  
 
Over time the CPA methodology was refined to provide what the Audit Commission 
called a ‘harder test’. Assessments of the main service blocks remained largely 
unchanged, but the five point scale was replaced by a four point star rating system 
ranging from ‘no star’ to ‘three stars’. Meanwhile the criteria for assessing corporate 
capacity were broadened to include the quality of an authority’s partnerships with other 
local agencies, its effectiveness as a community leader and the way in which it managed 
resources (Downe 2008). In April 2009 CPAs were superseded by Comprehensive Area 
Assessments (CAAs) which assessed all of the key public services in a locality (Audit 
Commission 2011). CAAs were intended to provide an independent and ‘joined up’ 
assessment of the quality of life in each locality. There were two main elements. An Area 
Assessment focused on priorities set out in local area agreements which had been agreed 
with central government departments. The police, health service, local authority and fire 
and rescue services were also subject to Organisational Assessments which evaluated 
their own management and performance. Unlike CPAs, area and organisational 
assessments did not involve primary data collection. They relied on existing inspection 
reports, external audits and a slightly reduced set of 190 statutory performance 
indicators.  
 
The rationale for the introduction of CAAs was twofold. First, they were supposed to 
enable the seven different local inspectorates (the Audit Commission, Commission for 
Social Care Inspection; Healthcare Commission; HM Inspectorate of Constabulary; HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons; HM Inspectorate of Probation; and the Office for Standards in 
Education, Children's Services and Skills) to coordinate their activities and therefore 
reduce the burden of inspection on local agencies. Second, they were designed to 
encourage local service providers to work together to tackle deep seated economic and 
social issues (such as economic regeneration; care for older people; the number of young 
people not in education, employment or training; shortages of affordable housing; 
environmental sustainability; crime; violent extremism; and ill health) which were not 
the sole preserve of any of them but required concerted action by a range of different 
sectors.  
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The Impacts of Centralism 
Many observers were fiercely critical of what they saw as the Labour Government’s 
unwarranted interference in local affairs. Stewart (2003: 253) complained of ‘over-
prescription; over-inspection and over-regulation’. Wilson (2003) accused ministers of 
‘control freakery gone mad’. Davies castigated them for ‘double dealing’ – talking up 
devolution whilst doing the opposite. Top-down performance frameworks had, he 
claimed, led to an ‘intensification of managerialism at the expense of local democracy’ 
(Davies 2008: 4). As a result councillors had become ‘little more than elected managers, 
rather than local politicians able to articulate and act upon the wishes of the citizenry’ 
(Copus 2006: 5).   
 
According to its detractors, New Labour’s approach was wrong both in principle and 
practice. For them local government was closest to and therefore best placed to 
understand the needs of local communities. The imposition of external inspection 
betrayed a lack of trust in local councillors and was an insult to their local democratic 
mandate. External performance regimes were said to foster a compliance mentality 
which stifled innovation (van Thiel and Leeuw 2002: 270). Accountability was 
channelled upwards to ministers, robbing councils of the flexibility they need to be 
responsive to local priorities. Inspection was also costly. According to government 
figures, by 2005 the direct costs of the local government inspectorates in England 
amounted to £97 million per annum (ODPM/HM Treasury 2005), and research found 
that councils devoted an average of 597 staff days per annum to preparing for and 
managing inspection site visits (Downe and Martin 2007). The time taken up by this 
‘paperwork’ could, it was argued, have been better spent on the core task of managing 
‘frontline services’ (Hood and Peters 2004: 278). Some scholars also questioned the 
rigour of the performance assessment methodologies. Andrews (2004) criticised CPAs 
for failing to take account of the impact of deprivation on performance. Jacobs and 
Goddard (2007) and Cutler and Waine (2003) argued that star rating systems were 
misleading because they mask the complex and multi-faceted nature of performance and 
aggregate scores were determined largely by the weightings that were used. Maclean et 
al. (2007) showed CPA judgements to be a poor predictor of future performance.  
 
However, there is evidence that the combination of large increases in spending and top 
down performance management regimes was associated with significant performance 
improvement. Analysis of Best Value Performance Indicators showed that whilst there 
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were variations between services, most registered significant improvement and some 
(notably waste management and culture services) achieved spectacular gains (Martin 
2009a). These data need to be treated with some caution because the number of 
indicators per service is small and there were differences in the rate of change registered 
by different indicators within some services. For example two of the three indicators of 
performance in children’s social services declined slightly whilst the third increased by 
almost 100 percent. However, other sources confirm the picture of overall improvement. 
Over time CPA scores increased in nearly all services. Between 2002 and 2008 almost 
three quarters (72 percent) of authorities moved up one or more categories in terms of 
their overall performance. The proportion ranked in the top group rose from 15 to 42 
percent, whilst the numbers in the lowest two groups decreased from 23 percent to 3 
percent (Audit Commission, 2009). By 2006 almost all of the 150 unitary and upper tier 
authorities in England were judged by the Audit Commission to be improving (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Improvement judgements by the Audit Commission  












London Boroughs 0 3 72 18 6 
County councils 0 15 59 6 21 
Metropolitan boroughs 0 28 56 6 11 
Unitary authorities 2 28 55 4 5 
 
A third source of evidence about local government performance was provided by 
household surveys undertaken in 2000/2001, 2003/04 and 2006/07. Each council was 
required to achieve a minimum sample size of 1,100 residents which produced a national 
sample of over 562,000 respondents.  Results were then weighted by age, gender and 
ethnicity. Analysis of these data showed that between 2003/04 and 2006/07 there were 
increases in public satisfaction with all of the services covered by the survey except for 
household waste collection, theatres and concert halls, and museums and galleries (Table 
2).  The three services in which satisfaction went down might be considered special 
cases. Perceptions of waste collection were adversely affected by a move from weekly to 
fortnightly services in response to European Union targets designed to reduce the volume 
of landfill. Theatres, concert halls, museums and galleries are all discretionary services 
which many councils do not offer. 
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Table 2.  Percentage change in public satisfaction 2003/04-2006/07 










galleries -2 -2 -1 0 -1 
Waste collection -7 N/A -6 -3 +4 
Theatres and 
concert halls -8 -3 -3 -3 -1 
Parks and spaces +1 +3 0 +1 +4 
Sport and leisure +5 +4 +1 +1 +4 
Public transport 
information N/A +3 +2 +4 +9 
Tips N/A +1 +3 +4 +10 
Libraries +5 +5 +4 +4 +6 
Recycling +1 N/A +3 +4 +10 
Local buses N/A +6 +5 +4 +11 
Cleanliness +6 N/A +7 +7 +13 
 
Research on the reasons for these performance improvements suggests that external 
inspection was an important stimulus for change. Local government managers and 
national policy makers reported that CPAs had been a particularly effective driver of 
change (Downe and Martin 2006).  Similarly, although local authorities, police and 
health bodies were critical of the burdens which CAA placed on them, most believed that 
it had encouraged better joint working and focused attention on important public service 
outcomes (Hayden et al. 2010). Comparisons with Wales and Scotland, which eschewed 
the kinds of hard edged performance frameworks adopted in England, paint a similar 
picture. They suggest that local government performance has not improved as rapidly in 
these countries (Martin et al. 2010; Andrews and Martin 2010), a finding which is 
consistent with research in the health services which also shows that top down targets in 
England led to more rapid improvements than was achieved in other parts of the UK 
(Bevan and Hood 2006). 
 
The Prospects for ‘Localism’ 
Given the evidence of performance improvement under New Labour it is perhaps 
surprising that in the run up to the 2010 General Election all three main political parties 
promised to shift power away from central government and back to localities. In truth 
Labour ministers had already started to pull back from top down performance 
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management and to emphasise the importance of engaging with local communities 
(DCLG 2008). They argued the improvements that had taken place meant that some 
controls could now be relaxed. The former head of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit 
suggested that inspection became less necessary and less productive as public services 
moved performance levels which he described as ‘awful to adequate’ (Barber 2007). 
More importantly local government faced tough new challenges.  Spending cuts meant 
that they were going to have to transform the way they delivered services in order to 
make huge efficiency savings (Davis and Martin 2008).  Meanwhile the main opposition 
parties saw top-down performance assessments as emblematic of all that was wrong with 
the approach to public services reform pursued by Prime Minister Blair and his 
Chancellor (and successor) Gordon Brown. The Liberal Democrats were long standing 
champions of decentralisation, whilst Conservative shadow ministers pledged to wage 
war on ‘Labour’s culture of control’. They would, they said, take power away from the 
bureaucrats (including inspectors) in order to ‘make local councils accountable to local 
people’ and give them ‘the freedom to respond to the demands made by those local 
people’ (Conservative Party 2009). 
 
The early indications were that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 
which came to power in 2010 intended to act on these promises. One of the first acts of 
the new Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government was to instruct the 
inspectorates to stop all work on the next round of CAAs. Then within three months - 
without any prior warning or consultation - he announced the abolition of Audit 
Commission, accusing it of having ‘lost its way’. Responsibility for external auditing of 
local authority accounts is to be transferred to the commercial sector with accounting 
standards overseen by the National Audit Office.  Standards for England, a body created 
by Labour to oversee a framework designed to ensure that local politicians maintain good 
standards of conduct, was also abolished. The Department of Health subsequently 
announced an end to annual performance assessments of councils by the Care Quality 
Commission and the schools inspectorate began to phase out its annual assessments of 
children’s services.  The Government explained that its actions were intended: 
 
to free up local authorities to enable them to be innovative in the delivery of 
services, rather than merely seeking to raise performance against centrally 
established criteria to achieve good inspection results. Local authorities will have 
the freedom to deliver services in ways that meet local needs, and will be 
accountable for those services to their electorates. These principles are key 
elements of localism (DCLG 2011: para 22).  
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Government departments will continue to have a role in specifying and aggregating 
information which is ‘of national importance’ or required to ensure accountability to 
Parliament. But ‘the principal aim is to reduce the burden of data collection on local 
government’ (DCLG 2011: para 25).  
 
In line with these proposals, the budget of the Department of Communities and Local 
Government has been cut by about a third, diminishing its capacity to monitor local 
government and the Government’s regional offices, which played a key role in 
performance management of local government under Labour, have been closed. 
According to ministers, the emphasis will now be on providing citizens with the 
information that they need to hold councils to account and it will be up to local 
authorities to decide what data to release and how to make them available. A ‘Localism 
Bill’ introduced in Parliament in December 2010 (House of Commons 2010) proposed a 
number of changes which apparently give councils more autonomy. They will be granted 
a general power of competence and can choose revert to the traditional committee system 
that was abolished by Labour. However, other changes will be imposed on local 
authorities. Twelve of the largest English cities will be forced to install directly elected 
mayors and all councils will be required to publish details of their senior staff pay. The 
Localism Bill therefore sends out mixed messages which can be read in at least four 
different ways.  
 
One interpretation it is a sham. Critics have been quick to point out that ministers retain 
the powers which their predecessors took to intervene in authorities. The Society of 
Local Authority Chief Executives complained that the bill has a distinctly ‘Orwellian 
quality’. It asked ‘how on earth can we maintain the fiction that this is a Localism Bill 
when it has 142 new regulatory powers for the Secretary of State?’ and concludes that 
‘This is centralist, not localist, and does nothing in pursuit of the government's desire to 
usher in a “post-bureaucratic age”’ (SOLACE 2011).  
 
A second interpretation is that the Bill is a genuine attempt by the Department of 
Communities and Local Government (which has been responsible for drafting the 
legislation) to devolve power but that other departments are less committed to this 
agenda.  In particular it remains to be seen whether the Departments for Education and 
Health, which oversee the largest spending local authority services, will follow its lead. 
Some commentators see the absence of any fundamental change in local authority 
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funding as the ‘acid test’. There has been a reduction in the amount of ring fencing, but 
ministers will continue to determine how much funding is available to each council. 
There are proposals to localise control over non-domestic rates but even if this does 
eventually happen English local authorities will still not have the same degree of fiscal 
autonomy enjoyed by their counterparts in many other parts of the world. 
 
A third interpretation is that ministers are serious about devolving power but not to local 
authorities. According to this view the government wants to hand control to local 
communities than to local councillors. The aim would be to empower citizens in line 
with the Prime Minister’s vision of creating a ‘Big Society’ where people take more 
responsibility for their own well being and the state does and spends less (Cabinet Office 
2011). This would mean that local groups take over the running of services from local 
authorities and play a more active part in local decision making. Whilst the Local 
Government Association (the main representative body of local authorities in England) 
has repeatedly argued that councils should regulate their own performance (De Groot 
2006; IDeA 2009; LGA 2011), the Secretary of State has emphasised the importance of 
enabling local people to keep local authorities in check, even though evidence from 
household surveys suggests that few citizens have any real appetite for doing so (Martin 
2009b).  As a senior civil servant explained it to me, ‘We’re looking to leap frog over 
local government and empower local people’. 
 
Fourth, it could be argued that the ‘new localism’ is being used by ministers as a cloak 
for spending cuts.  Between 2011 and 2014 local authorities will be asked to reduce their 
spending by around a quarter. With much of the pain being ‘front end loaded’, councils 
are being forced to shed staff and reduce services and in this context localism might be 
seen as a way for ministers to put some distance in the voters’ minds between themselves 
and reductions in local services. Whereas the Blair/Brown governments handed local 
authorities additional funding in the expectation of significant improvements in 
performance, Prime Minister Cameron is offering local government freedom from central 
controls in return for doing the dirty work of cutting services. 
 
The eventual scope and significance of the coalition government’s localist agenda is 
difficult to predict. However whatever course it takes, two things are clear. First, English 
local authorities face a different and difficult future and a range of new challenges. 
Second, the sharp break with the central government policies of the past presents new 
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opportunities for scholars, opening up an intriguing research agenda on the impacts of 
the ‘hands off’ approach promised by the current crop of ministers. 
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